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Anxiety and the Creation of the Scapegoated Other 
 
Abstract 
This article examines how anxiety saturates the neo-Orientalist driven thesis of new 
terrorism, especially in how both anxiety and new terrorism are related to the unknown. 
Of particular importance is the description of al Qaeda as an amorphous and thus 
unknowable threat by Western academics and the media, which reifies the discursive 
neo-Orientalist binary of the West versus Islam. Scholars of International Relations are 
increasingly engaging with emotions and their impact on binary and hierarchical 
structures. Emotions operate relationally as they are the articulation of affect. The 
emotions discursively constitute identity and community structures, helping to inform 
ideas of self and other. The more specific study of anxiety reveals similarities, but anxiety 
also operates differently from other emotions as it is focused on future potentialities. 
Thus, terrorism and anxiety are co-constitutive in their conceptual dependency on futurity 
and uncertainty that sustain the neo-Orientalist binary. 
 
Keywords:  
Emotion, Anxiety, Terrorism, neo-Orientalism, Discourse, Poststructuralism 
 
Beginning with Neta Crawford’s (2000) seminal piece and continuing with Christine 
Sylvester’s (2012) focus upon the experiences and experiencing of war, how emotions 
discursively constitute and structure communal hierarchies has become increasingly 
important to international relations (see also Edkins 2004; Fierke 2004; Solomon 2012; 
Manuscript - anonymous
2 
Hutchison 2013).
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 The feminist community emphasizes the study of emotions towards 
ethics (Nussbaum 2001), international politics (Crawford 2000), and understanding 
community trauma (Edkins 2004; Fierke 2004). Poststructuralists have also emphasized 
the importance of emotions in hierarchical structures (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; 
Solomon 2012; Åhäll and Gregory 2013) and both theoretical approaches focus upon 
emotion as a discursive practice. A person is reliant upon language to make his/her 
emotions intelligible to themselves and other people thus “emotion…belongs to a social 
world” (Fierke 2004, 480). Emotions are therefore relational (see also Edkins 2004; 
Sylvester 2012), a constitutive element of theorizing emotions that Sara Ahmed (2006, 
10) refers to as the “sociality of emotions.” As such, emotions help to build identity and 
constitute groupings, allowing for hierarchical structures of in- and out-groups to emerge 
(Hutchison 2013). 
 
This article relies upon emotion-based discursive structures to uncover the anxiety in the 
fight against terror and how it feeds into the binary construction of the US-self against the 
radical Islamist other after 9/11. While it has been noted previously that in the aftermath 
of 9/11, US society became fearful and anxious (Pyszcynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 
2002)— the public was anxious about further attacks (Kaiser, Vick, and Major 2004); 
and politicians were anxious to appease the public (Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley 2006)—
understanding how anxiety operates socially has not been explored in-depth. Thus, this 
article investigates how the politics of anxiety constructs radical Islamist terrorists as the 
ultimate scapegoat and justifies violence against them, particularly the assassination of 
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Osama bin Laden.  The sociality of anxiety quickly establishes in- and out-groups with 
particular identities and ways of thinking. Accordingly, the impulse to resolve anxiety 
leads to scapegoating (see Kerr 1988)—or blaming the out-group for a disproportionate 
responsibility in a present crisis.   
 
Anxiety creates and maintains the very binary upon which the US/Western response to 
terrorism is currently situated—the neo-Orientalist discursive binary of the rational, 
progressive US against the irrational, less progressive Muslim world (as discussed in 
Nayak 2006; Shepherd 2006; Nayak and Malone 2009). In this case, the global Muslim 
community began (if not continued) to bear the brunt of social anxiety about terrorism 
(Puar and Rai 2002, 120; Morey and Yaqin 2011; Esposito 2011). This convoluted binary 
is constituted through “sticky words” (Ahmed 2004, 11) and thus anxiety in general is 
related to fear and worry, but it is also sticky with indeterminacy, uncertainty, and 
unknowing-ness (see Massumi 2005; Ahmed 2004, 67). These happen to ‘saturate’ the 
object of terrorism, particularly radical Islamist terrorism as posed by al Qaeda. Thus, 
words and phrases used to describe the threat of al Qaeda and bin Laden are also used to 
describe or determine anxiety, such as amorphous, indeterminate, and/or evocative of 
futurity (for the treatment of the al Qaeda threat see Devetak 2005; Jackson 2008; and for 
the discussion of anxiety see Kerr 1988, 47). These sticky words fed in to the discursive 
hierarchy of the War on Terror allowing for violence, particularly the assassination of bin 
Laden, to become a resolution for the felt anxiety. 
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This article argues that the politics of anxiety differentiates between self/community and 
others, making the other a repository for the anxiety in a way that constructs them as 
scapegoats, which justifies violence between self/selves and others. It will begin by 
exploring the theorizing of emotions within IR, particularly the way that articulated 
emotions contribute to building self/other identities. More specifically anxiety is an 
emotion that creates relational ties, one that structures in- and out-groups thereby 
generating a hierarchical structure. Further, anxiety over terrorism in the US after 9/11 
developed alongside a neo-Orientalist view of the radical Islamic threat. The article will 
establish the relationship between anxiety-terrorism-neo-Orientalism by looking at the 
use of anxiety-related words by Western academics and media that saturate the object of 
radical Islamist terrorism. More importantly, this article will establish that Osama bin 
Laden was perceived as a threat to the US due to the anxiety that saturated terrorism. His 
assassination was seen as a way of resolving this anxiety. Therefore, emotions are 
fundamental to how security concerns are shaped and how they are strategized and 
(presumably) resolved.  
 
EMOTION LADEN: DISCURSIVE HIERARCHIES AND STICKY WORDS 
 
International relations scholarship has paid increasing attention to the role of emotions in 
politics (see Crawford 2000; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Åhäll and Gregory 2013; 
Hutchison 2013), therefore this paper argues it is important to look at the impact of 
anxiety upon the discursive construction and reification of self/other groups. This article 
acknowledges the importance of problematizing masculine rationality/feminine 
emotionality binary (see Pateman 1980, 22, 24, 26; Elshtain 1981; Nussbaum 2001, 16, 
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22; Ahmed 2004, 3), but extends the argument outside of this. Like Martha Nussbaum’s 
(2001, 2) articulation of the importance of emotions to ethical theorizing, this article 
holds that emotions need to be recognized for their impact on an individual but also for 
their impact on community.  
 
While feelings/emotions may be experienced internally they are associated with external 
behaviors that are dependent upon being recognized by others, which is “cognitively and 
culturally construed and constructed” (Crawford 2000, 125). Ahmed (2006, 10) refers to 
this as the sociality of emotions: the self and its community are constituted by how “we 
respond to objects and others.” Karin Fierke (2004, 480) draws out the discursive element 
further. She argues that we may “assume” some experiences, such as pain, “exist 
independent of language,” yet these are “fundamentally dependent upon language for 
their meaning.” Articulating an emotion “presupposes the existence of a grammar” that 
includes the word for it and reveals the “place of this word in relation to others” (Fierke 
2004, 480). Taking this one step further, emotions, “such as compassion, shame, or 
humiliation presume a relationship” between individuals. Therefore, “[t]he experience of 
emotion may be individual, but if expressed, it is expressed in relation to others, in a 
language understandable to them” (Fierke 2004, 480). Emotions are given meaning, 
impact, and importance through discourse and this in turn orders the emotions as well as 
the effect of them. 
 
It is the very sociality of emotions that leads to the creation of insider and outsider 
groupings (see Hutchison 2013). Emotions are oriented towards an object: “emotions 
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…are ‘about something.’ The ‘aboutness’ of emotions means they involve a stance on the 
world, or a way of apprehending the world” (Ahmed 2004, 7; see also Nussbaum 2001, 
26-7). Thus, our emotions about a particular object will either unite or divide us from 
others. It is well known that discourse constructs hierarchies—“[d]iscourse is the primary 
site for the exercise, not of consensual reasoning, but of power” (Epstein 2013, 502)—
and it should be equally recognized that emotions are integral to the creation of social 
constructions and social structures (Solomon 2012, 912). For instance, Ty Solomon 
(2012, 913-4) argues that emotions are discursive reality of affect (subject to human’s 
linguistic limitations), thus discursive structures and binaries are informed by emotions. 
Affect is an “‘indeterminate’ stat[e] of mood that remain[s] outside of discourse” 
(Solomon 2012, 918) that is sometimes identified with “influence” and “sensation” 
(Åhäll and Gregory 2013, 118). Affect becomes a “discursive reality” when people 
articulate it via “recognizable emotional signifiers” (Solomon 2012, 909, see also 918), 
thus emotions are the limited linguistic conceptions of affect. While the “affective 
experience… is diminished once the body is socialized into language” (Solomon 2012, 
914), it is nonetheless important since “affects and discourses infuse each other” (913). 
Therefore, it is not so easy to tease out affect/emotion from discourse and then from the 
hierarchies that they build and uphold. 
 
These emotion-laden discursive hierarchies are informed by what Sara Ahmed calls 
‘sticky words.’ Emotion moves through a community/social grouping through the 
circulation of the object of that emotion. This object becomes “sticky, or saturated with” 
emotion “as [a] sit[e] of personal and social tension” (Ahmed 2004, 11). The articulation 
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of emotion “generates” an object (Ahmed 2004, 13). For instance, Ahmed (2006, 13) 
uses the statement, “The nation mourns,” to illustrate how the nation is imbued with 
emotion and constituted by this emotional attribution. Furthermore, as an object of an 
emotion is circulated between individuals, the words that are related to a particular 
emotion are also dispersed resulting in a transference, where that particular emotion is 
now “stuck” to those other words (Ahmed 2004, 13). Additionally, when a nation 
‘mourns,’ it may be mourning some bodies over others or some mourners may be more 
important than others. As a result mourning may relate now to other words and 
emotions—sadness, anger, and grief—as well as to the hierarchy of which bodies or 
social groupings matter more (Ahmed 2004, 13). From this, one can see how emotions 
and related words adhere to a particular object as well as how these discursive practices 
reify and construct hierarchies. 
 
This previous work on emotions in international relations leads to several general 
conclusions. First, emotions are relational and inform community identity. This identity 
can contribute to the creation of insider/outsider status, which is inherently hierarchical. 
Secondly, emotions center upon and thus saturate particular objects. As these objects 
circulate, the emotion follows. Thus, words that ‘stick’ with the emotion-saturated-object 
feed into the emotion-laden discursive hierarchical structuring. As the next section will 
demonstrate, this can be seen in the operation of anxiety generally as well as in anxiety’s 
specific relationship with terrorism as an object of emotion. 
 
The Sociality of Anxiety 
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Some researchers on emotion divide emotions into ‘basic’ and ‘complex’ categories (see 
Power and Tarsia 2007). Basic emotions, such as anger, disgust, anxiety, happiness, and 
sadness, are the more immediate emotions a person may feel, but from these complex 
emotions follow (Power and Tarsia 2007, 20). For instance, the more complex emotion of 
fear stems from anxiety (Power and Tarsia 2007, 20). Other studies have reversed anxiety 
and fear, believing fear is a basic emotion from which the more complex emotion of 
anxiety forms, relating both to nervousness, tension, and worry (see Power and Tarsia 
2007, 21-2). Whether fear or anxiety is more complex is not necessarily important to this 
study because what this scholarship does is establish a psychological and discursive 
relationship between anxiety and fear, as well as nervousness, tension, worry, and 
vulnerability (see Holloway and Jefferson 1997, 256; Power and Tarsia 2007, 20-2). It is 
from the relationship between basic and complex emotions that one can identify anxiety-
related words in which their usage indicates how saturated an object might be with 
anxiety. 
 
Furthermore, multiple studies across disciplines including psychology (Kerr 1998, 48; 
Bowen 1993, 361-2; Power and Tarsia 2007), political science (Huddy et al. 2005; 
Druckman and McDermott 2008), sociology (Ahmed 2004), and social theory (Massumi 
2005) articulate anxiety alongside particular words that reflect the object-of-anxiety’s 
relationship with indeterminacy, unknowing-ness, and uncertainty. In fact, anxiety is 
differentiated from its related emotions precisely for these reasons. Fear is about a 
specific object’s approach to the subject whereas anxiety becomes fixated on the futurity 
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of the event or the activity of the object itself (Ahmed 2004, 67). This makes anxiety less 
about the subject-object interaction and more about the unknowable future activity of an 
object, which may result in the “overestimation of risk,” “a sense of uncertainty, [and a] 
lack of control” (Huddy et al. 2005, 593, 595). Anxiety continues to manifest around 
perceived/actual objects, such as threat (see Ungar 2001, 281) or, as will be argued later, 
risk (Daase and Kessler 2007). 
 
Multiple authors have provided evidence of the anxiety that existed within American 
society after 9/11. Pysczcynski et al. (2002, 91) found that anxiety was present amongst 
72 percent of Americans who believed another attack was imminent and amongst the 40 
percent of Americans who thought that they or family members would be victims of a 
terror attack. Further Kaiser et al. (2004) correlated the level of anxiety with a desire for 
revenge against the (radical Islamist) terrorists. These studies demonstrate that anxiety 
operates like all other emotions: relationally, that anxiety was wrought by a fear for 
community, as well as centered on an object (terrorist threat) that subsequently 
constituted a hierarchy of the US-self against the terrorist-other. Yet, anxiety also 
operates differently than fear—anxiety is more diffuse in its focus on possibilities and 
futurity (Kerr 1988, 48; Massumi 2005, 35; Ahmed 2004, 67). It is important to recognize 
that the future-centeredness of anxiety means it is an emotion that lingers and feeds off of 
uncertainty.  
 
Psychiatrist Murray Bowen’s (1993) family systems theory gives some profound insight 
into how anxiety involves the futurity of an event and how this impacts the sociality of 
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anxiety, leading to scapegoating. When a system encounters constant anxiety, or chronic 
anxiety, the response is to turn inward in a desire for “oneness”—or efforts to think and 
act alike (Kerr 1988, 50; Bowen 1993, 177-9; Ahmed 2004, 71). Such unity, however, is 
unstable because the anxious group becomes increasingly less tolerant of difference (Kerr 
1988, 50; Bowen 1993, 178).  This leads to the creation of a scapegoat as a repository for 
all negative events (Kerr 1998; see Bowen 1993, 443). A scapegoat is derived from how 
“anxiety and fear create the effect of borders” (Ahmed 2004, 76) leading to articulation 
of a self/collective to be protected from an-other. Othering happens when humans allow 
the differences seen in other people, whether it is gender, class, race/ethnicity, religion, 
etc., to constitute an absolute, dehumanizing difference between the self and other (see 
Bronfen 1992, 182; Volf 1996, 77). In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslims became the 
scapegoated other in the US and the West due to the disproportionate fear of radical 
Islamic political violence (Tuastad 2003; Cole 2011, 128; Morey and Yaqin 2011, 18-9). 
The next section will show how this was owed to felt and shared anxiety over the object 
of terrorism. 
 
The very power of terrorism is based upon the perceived indeterminacy of its threat—that 
the ‘terrorists’ might strike again at any time, in any place, creating anyone as a 
(potential) victim (Schmid and Jongman 2006, 5; Braithwaite 2013). The events of 9/11 
provoked one of the strongest and complex “global economies of fear” (Ahmed 2004, 
72), which interplays with anxiety in this instance, leading to an “ontology of insecurity” 
where security can only be maintained through the continued articulation of who/what is 
to be secured (76). In arguing that there is an object of security, such as the self, 
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collective, or state, there must be something to be made insecure. This returns us to the 
importance of the scapegoat (see also Holloway and Jefferson 1997, 260). In the War on 
Terror, this has become the radical Islamist other and 
“[k]nowing” [this] Other is integral to protecting and securing what one “knows” 
to be true about the [US’] Self (i.e. the Self is good, normal, enlightened, 
progressive, and right and the [Muslim] Other is backwards, barbaric, primitive, 
and dangerous) (Nayak 2006, 46). 
 
Thus, it is important to study terrorism further as an object of anxiety and to determine 
what words and phrases saturate terrorism as the object of US anxiety in particular. 
 
THE STICKINESS OF ANXIETY: DISCURSIVE NEO-ORIENTALIST 
BINARIES AND THE NEW TERRORISM THESIS 
 
This section will clarify the relationship between anxiety and the object of radical 
Islamist terrorism, particularly as emotions and words associated with anxiety, such as 
fear, indeterminacy, and uncertainty, are often used by Western academics and the media 
to describe terrorism. The anxiety-driven discursive creation of scapegoats is witnessed in 
neo-Orientalism, which identifies the irrational Muslim other as a security threat to the 
rational Western self (Nayak 2006, 43). In practice, Orientalism is a discursive 
construction used by the West to claim an authority over Arabs/Arabia (Said 1979, 7; 
Said 2004, 61). Neo-Orientalism offers an update to include critical examinations of 
gender, sexuality, and the conflation of Muslims with Arabs (Akram 2000, 8-9; Nayak 
2006, 43). Moreover, neo-Orientalism constructs Muslims as fundamental religious 
fanatics resistant to progress and education, differentiating Muslims from liberal, 
progressive, and tolerant Westerners (see Nayak 2006; Shepherd 2006; Hellmich 2008; 
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Gentry and Whitworth 2011). This bias infuses the new terrorism thesis, which holds that 
future terrorist events will be (and have been) driven by large-scale attacks dependent 
upon fundamentalists (such as radical Islamist violence).  
 
Terrorism and Neo-Orientalism 
 
Terrorism studies and attitudes towards terrorism have been influenced by neo-
Orientalism since at least the mid-1980s (see Rapoport 1984; Jackson 2007). It is mainly 
witnessed in the new terrorism thesis first articulated in the 1990s by Walter Laqueur 
(1996; 2000) and Bruce Hoffman (1999; 2002). They argued that terrorist tactics, which 
used to avoid mass casualties, were evolving into events of a large-scale casualties and 
destruction—triggering Western anxieties that terrorists would use WMDs. The new 
terrorists justified large-scale attacks through radical, religious ideologies (Jurgensmeyer 
2000; Stern 2003). After the rise of al Qaeda in the late 1990s, culminating, of course, 
with the 9/11, Madrid, and 7/7 bombings, new terrorism became tied to radical Islam and 
the “amorphous” (as will be discussed below this is an adjective related to anxiety) al 
Qaeda network (see Tuastad 2003; Hoffman 2003 and 2004; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 
2010).  
 
In his 2003 article, Dag Tuastad traces how neo-Orientalist academic scholarship 
influenced the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11 (Tuastad 2003, 592; see also 
Nayak and Malone 2009, 257). The discourse of the Bush administration relied upon both 
neo-Orientalism and the new terrorism thesis to set the US apart from and above the 
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radical Muslim other as the enemy in the War on Terror (Puar and Rai 2002; Hellmich 
2008; Solomon 2012, 910). Neo-Orientalism coming out of the US is an extension of the 
historical progression of American exceptionalism. The War on Terror is one more way 
for the US to show itself as a beacon of progress and liberalism in the world (Nayak 
2006, 44; Nayak and Malone 2009, 254-5, 261). Thus, while the West is one way of 
constituting a collective the US constructed an even more particular self/collective 
identity (Nayak 2006, 46; Nayak and Malone 2009).  
 
This literature and construction of the radical Islamic threat relies upon several premises 
that are associated with anxiety. The very basis of the ‘new terror’ threat had to do with 
the potential of a previously unseen type of attack—mass casualties and widespread 
destruction that could happen anywhere, at any time, to anyone. The new terror threat is 
dependent upon being an amorphous threat, which then imbues the conflation of new 
terrorism and neo-Orientalism in anxiety. It is also reliant upon a fear and distrust of the 
other that threatens not just US/Western security but Western ways of being. The anxiety 
stems from a conception of self, community, and nationality that are bound up with 
Western/US values that are all seen as uniformly different from the other’s identity (Puar 
and Rai 2002; Tuastad 2003; Kochi 2009)—and these differences pose a threat and a 
danger that the self cannot afford to give into (see Kerr 1988, 37). 
 
Sticky Terrorism: Anxiety and neo-Orientalism 
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Brian Massumi’s (2005) articulation of terrorism identifies how it is saturated with 
anxiety. For Massumi, the threat of terrorism after 9/11 was “unknowable,” lacking 
specificity and determinacy. As an object terrorism was all but formless: “If it has a form, 
it is not a substantial form” (Massumi 2005, 35). Sara Ahmed’s examination of anxiety 
and terrorism within the sociality of emotions helps to further this point. She finds that 
‘terrorist’ has become sticky with Islam, Arab, fundamentalism, repressive, and primitive 
(Ahmed 2004, 76). These, of course, are words essential to reifying the discursive neo-
Orientalist binary. She also draws attention to the “the narrative of the ‘could be’ 
terrorist,” which reflects the potentiality of anxiety. The narrative holds that terrorists are 
construed “as…shadowy figure[s]” permeating their activity with “an unspecifiable may-
come-to-pass” (Ahmed 2004, 79). This “unknowing-ness” is important for multiple 
reasons. First, it reveals the attachment of anxiety to terrorism. Anxiety is rhetorically and 
emotionally attached to uncertainty and the unknown.  Second, neo-Orientalist anxiety 
has passed to new terrorism. Unknowingness became part of the way to construct and 
implement action by the US in the War on Terror. Third, this shadowy quality surrounds 
the descriptions of bin Laden, as the master terrorist hiding in mountain caves. 
 
The usage of ‘amorphous’ to describe the al Qaeda network in the decade after 9/11 is 
particularly telling. Massumi’s quote from above is, in essence, the definition of 
amorphous: “having no specific shape; formless” according to dictionary.com. It is a 
word both sticky with anxiety but also with new terrorism and al Qaeda. Scholarship 
roots the amorphous nature of the network within new terrorism due to the risks: counter-
15 
terrorists could not be sure of where the next attack would happen and from what 
direction because of the extensive reach of the al Qaeda network.  
 
Several key terrorism studies scholars (Hoffman 2003 and 2004; Sanderson 2004; 
Jackson 2006) rely upon the adjective to describe al Qaeda’s transformation from a 
centralized command structure to a network. Sanderson’s (2004, 56 & 59) use highlights 
the new terrorism threat: the change of terrorist group structures from centralized to 
“amorphous” (56) presents a “dramatically increasing…challenge to government efforts 
at combating these groups” (59). The ‘amorphous’ network structure is explicitly linked 
with the religious frame of new terrorism when Jackson (2006) contrasts al Qaeda—as an 
“amorphous ideological movement for global jihad” (241)—with the “small size and 
tight organization” of  “‘classic’ left-wing groups in Europe” (242). Amorphous is 
associated with the perceived ‘new’ challenges of al Qaeda—presenting its difference not 
just due to group structure but also stemming from ideological framework. Amorphous 
here signals the anxiety over the unknowns change brings. Similarly, amorphous is 
embedded within a series of rhetorical questions Hoffman poses to demonstrate how little 
is known about al Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11: 
Is [al Qaeda] a monolithic, international terrorist organization with an identifiable 
command and control apparatus or is it a broader, more amorphous movement 
tenuously held together by a loosely networked transnational constituency? Has it 
become a franchise operation with like-minded local representatives 
independently advancing the parent organization’s goals or does it still function at 
the direction of some centralized command nucleus? Is al Qaeda a concept or a 
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virus? An army or an ideology? A populist transnational movement or a vast 
international criminal enterprise? All of the above? None of the above? Or, some 
of the above? (italic emphasis added) 
 
While Hoffman is using ‘amorphous’ to discuss al Qaeda’s possible structural 
transformation, it is a singular word embedded in a series of examples of unknowns and 
part of his challenge to the perceived uncertainty, or arguably, the anxiety.   
 
An echo of this can be found in Donald Rumsfeld’s rather famous statement from a 
Department of Defense briefing in February 2002: 
… because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones 
we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our 
country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the 
difficult ones. 
 
Embedded in this are implications of both anxiety and neo-Orientalism. Implicit in the 
usage of “our country and other free countries” are Western ideals, situating the 
“unknown unknowns” (if not all of his categorizations) as stemming from outside “free 
countries,” i.e. the non-West. But more so, anxiety is implicit throughout Rumsfeld’s 
focus upon the vulnerability of the unknowingness.   
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Daase and Kessler’s (2007) excellent deconstruction of Rumsfeld’s statement focuses on 
the epistemological and practical reality of these un/known categorizations, particularly 
for risk assessment and security policy. While Daase and Kessler did not use the 
language of emotions or even discuss anxiety, the implications of it are throughout. They 
assert “uncertainty” is “the central problem of foreign and security policy today” (Daase 
and Kessler 2007, 412). Decision-making today, particularly risk assessment, is not based 
on “firm knowledge” (412) especially as terrorism (the “primary security concern”) 
“requires bold new strategies because of its shadowy character and its incalculable 
dangers” (412). Basically, the unknowingness of terrorism is the “risk” (412, 413, and 
418). Terrorism is especially illustrative of Rumsfeld’s “known unknowns” because of its 
constant imposition on future security (Daase and Kessler 2007, 424). Furthermore, 
terrorism is a pernicious known unknown as it is difficult to “trace new developments and 
spontaneous changes in motivational structure.” So while terrorism is not predictable a 
new attack is always probable (Daase and Kessler 2007, 424). The wording used in the 
deconstruction—uncertainty, shadowy, incalculable—aligns with near perfection to 
Ahmed’s list of terrorism-centered anxiety words. 
 
Killing bin Laden 
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Moreover, this anxiety over the uncertainty of the terrorist threat is very present in 
discursive constructions of Osama bin Laden’s leadership.2 If al Qaeda was constructed 
as amorphous and indeterminate, then as its leader bin Laden was constructed as even 
more so.  For instance, a Google search on 12 September 2014 for the terms “bin Laden 
amorphous” resulted in 9,890,000 hits. Further reading of the articles that were returned 
on the first page of the Google search was also revealing: the discourse that is related to 
anxiety is often also immediately accompanied by neo-Orientalist language. 
 
For instance, a 2004 Economist article declared al Qaeda to be “amorphous but alive” in 
its headline, detailing that another attack by al Qaeda was a certainty but, due to its 
“ideological franchise,” where these would come from is unknown.  Referencing al 
Qaeda members as “jihadis,” it argues that they “draw their strength from a common pool 
of self-righteous anger at what they see as the humiliation of Muslims at the hands of 
West.” The looming threat stems from a neo-Orientalist understanding of emotions 
attributed to (all) Muslims: the article implies to its Western readers that the anger is 
misguided as it is only these particular people who see this humiliation. It 
decontextualizes the violence from any post-colonial issue while still reifying communal 
boundaries between the West and Islam.   
 
                                                        
2
 Richard Devetak (2005) demonstrates how the indeterminate qualities that surround 
constructions of al Qaeda also were used to construe bin Laden as a ‘ghost’ (as opposed 
to the construction of Saddam Hussein as a ‘monster’).  
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A website, titled “Understanding the Conflict: Terrorism,” hosted by The Seattle Times 
visually and rhetorically links bin Laden and al Qaeda with all terrorism. At the center of 
the page is a picture of bin Laden, which is accompanied by a brief description of him. 
Underneath this picture, the viewer can then explore “Al-Qaida” or “Terrorist Groups.” 
Before clicking on the links, the website offers brief descriptions. Al Qaeda is described 
as an “amorphous” “international terrorist network.” The descriptor for “Terrorist 
Groups” declares that terrorists, without differentiating between fundamental Christians, 
national-separatist, or Marxist groups, share a “vision of holy war [that] excludes any 
possibility of compromise.” Thus a reader moves from bin Laden to the anxiety related 
conceptualization of ‘amorphous’ al Qaeda to the neo-Orientalist idea that all terrorists 
uncompromisingly wage (Islamist) holy war—removing reason and the idea that one 
could negotiate or talk with ‘terrorists.’ 
 
Such conceptualizations lead to this idea of the terrorist as monstrous (see Puar and Rai 
2002). In fact, the CIA created a doll of bin Laden that first appeared to be a normal 
action-figure but heat from skin contact would alter the appearance of his face into a red-
faced green-eyed demon (Goldman 2014). While the CIA never distributed these toys to 
children, it feeds into the idea that bin Laden was a terrifying, inhuman threat. Anxiety-
laced-neo-Orientalism surrounds bin Laden. He is described as an “elusive” “master 
terrorist,” hiding out in the “badlands on the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan” (Reid 
2009). The master terrorist label ascribes some sort of mythic/mystic power to bin Laden 
that has roots within a neo-Orientalist framing. Robert Fisk’s 1993 interview with bin 
Laden for The Independent begins by describing bin Laden: 
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With his high cheekbones, narrow eyes and long [gold-fringed] brown robe, Mr 
Bin Laden looks every inch the mountain warrior of mujahideen legend.  
Chadored children danced in front of him, preachers acknowledged his wisdom 
(Fisk 1993).   
 
Bin Laden then is a monster, a mystic, a terrorist beyond all others. He leads a shadowy 
organization and equally hides in the shadows of Afghanistan-Pakistan’s mountains. 
Anxiety and fear over bin Laden and al Qaeda culminated in his assassination in 2011.  
 
Within days of the attacks, posters were seen in Manhattan depicting bin Laden being 
sodomized by the Empire State Building with the caption “The Empire Strikes Back” 
(Puar and Rai 2002, 126).  While this is of course deeply gendered and homo-erotic-
phobia (for a deeper discussion see Puar and Rai 2002), it is indicative of a need for 
revenge. In the aftermath of 9/11, many Americans expressed the sentiment for revenge 
as a product of their anxieties over the attacks (Kaiser et al. 2004). In fact, revenge 
produces similar neural activity to the rush from drug use, reducing anxiety (Jaffe 2011). 
Anxiety also dissipates when victims of either crime or terrorism feel that justice, 
retribution, or revenge have been achieved (Hafer 2000, 171; Kaiser et al. 2004, 505). 
The anxiety produced by 9/11 and the perceived need to retaliate against Muslims makes 
problematic ‘sense’ in this light (Morey and Yaqin 2011, 18).  
 
When bin Laden’s death assassination was announced on 1 May 2011, celebrations that 
grew increasingly raucous broke out in front of the White House and on the streets of 
New York. These reactive celebrations were visual reminders of how much bin Laden, as 
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the ultimate terrorist, had been dehumanized. His dying was not the death of a human, but 
the death of a person constituted as a supernatural figure—the ultimate other (see Puar 
and Rai 2002, 118-119; Devetak 2005, 624). Thus his death was simply the provision of 
security and the resolution of anxiety to those who hated him. Mark Thompson, writing 
for time.com (2011), stated his death “represents sweet vindication.”  
 
On 3 May 2011, two days after the assassination, the New York Times asked readers to 
respond to the following questions: “Was his death significant in our war against terror? 
And do you have a negative or positive view of this event?” Each of the 13,684 
respondents plotted their answer onto an interactive graph
3
 that is divided into four 
quadrants. The left-right axis weighs the emotional response, ranging from negative on 
the left to positive on the right. The up-down axis measures the significance of his death, 
with most significant at the top and insignificant at the bottom. Where a respondent 
plotted him/herself is marked with a blue square, hovering over the square with a mouse 
reveals the comment; when people chose the same square, the blue is darker. The upper-
right quadrant (a positive response to a ‘significant’ death) contains the most blue squares 
overall as well as more darker blue squares. This was also the most interesting quadrant 
to this paper because these responses tended to be pleased by the victory/revenge of his 
assassination. To quote a few: “This was emotionally important for many Americans… 
Justice in whatever form it was done, was needed;” “I see no negatives to our actions.  
Highly significant because it showed that none of these people are safe...” But many in 
this quadrant were also worried about the possibility al Qaeda retaliation. Together these 
                                                        
3
 The URL is: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/03/us/20110503-osama-
response.html?_r=0 
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comments speak to how anxiety operates: that revenge is felt to be a salve to anxiety only 
to have anxiety continue due to possible future attacks.  
 
Indeed, the persistence of anxiety can be read in a CNN blog post by William Bennett 
and Seth Leibsohn two days after the assassination. They reflected that his death was “a 
welcome victory and much-hoped-for news in our long fight,” before discussing the 
threat of new terrorism.  In this frame, his death was not enough: “unless and until [his 
death] is seen as a new beginning and a new seriousness in our war against radical Islam, 
more Americans will be killed.”  Addressing the al Qaeda threat seriously means the US 
recognize that al Qaeda has “metastasized” beyond bin Laden through the network and 
that bin Laden’s death has created a vacuum for “who knows what kinds of leaders” 
(Bennett and Leibsohn 2011). In their anxiety over the future potential or retaliatory 
attacks by al Qaeda, Bennett and Leibsohn clearly delineate their community (the US) 
against the cancerous radical Islamic threat that al Qaeda is.  
 
THE POLITICS OF ANXIETY: THE INEVITABILITY OF THE SCAPEGOAT 
 
As Crawford (2000) suggested, politics are informed by emotion. Hence, security is 
informed by emotion (see also Åhäll and Gregory 2013). If the purpose of critical 
security studies is to challenge epistemological considerations of security, this article then 
argues that it is not just emotions but the specific emotion of anxiety that should be of 
significant importance to security scholars and practitioners. Anxiety is something of a 
unique emotion; in and of itself, it is a bit indeterminate and amorphous due to its 
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relationship with other emotions—fear, worry, uncertainty—as well as its future-
centredness.  
 
The current fascination with the new terrorism thesis is anxiety-centred if not anxiety-
driven. New terrorism captures its audience through the idea that these raging, religious 
fanatics can strike anyone, anywhere, at anytime, killing an unknown mass quantity of 
people. This is the very definition of anxiety. The indeterminate quality of anxiety drives 
a need to scapegoat others, which is seen most clearly in current affairs in the War on 
Terror and the continuing fallout from it. Hence, anxiety is not just an emotion that stands 
alone and has no place in politics and security. It underpins how risk is perceived and 
dealt with, particularly in the way that such perceptions lead to the creation of 
scapegoated others from which the self must be protected.  Anxiety also drives a desire 
for revenge because it is perceived to be a way to preserve the self. The targeting of bin 
Laden was just this. He was the ultimate, neo-Orientalist other made monstrous and 
mythologized. Yet, most importantly, anxiety is not so easily resolved. Even in the 
discussions of bin Laden’s death, the anxiety returned in ways that were discursively 
linked to a neo-Orientalist bias. 
 
Neo-orientalism is a discursive construction and it is a construction that aligns with 
anxiety not just within this moment over terrorism. It is a construction larger than 
terrorism—it is an anxious construction about the Western self versus the Muslim other. 
It is an all too easily accessible construction used in the colonial moment and now in a 
post-colonial moment to maintain the status-quo hierarchy. Anxiety surrounds this 
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powerful structuring—as a pre-linguistic reaction to external stimuli it forms the self; as a 
verbalized emotion it secures the self to a community; and the articulation of anxiety 
builds the social hierarchy, binding anxiety with the binary of neo-Orientalism—granting 
permission to use violence against the scapegoat.  
 
The anxiety fed neo-Orientalism rests on a flawed premise of complete self/other 
differentiation. It is not possible to live without challenges to the self because humans are 
relational and communal (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000, 5). Living in community 
means that humans are vulnerable to each other—each person’s security rests in another’s 
goodwill. Therefore human life is one of mutual dependency (Levinas 2006, 29, 64; 
Butler 2006, 2009). There are different ways to react to this vulnerability.  One is to 
recognize the creative dynamic that comes with living in community; another would be to 
give into the anxiety and fear that vulnerability might generate (see Gentry 2013, 51). 
 
There is a different way forward. For Levinas (2006, 28) mutual vulnerability demands a 
‘liturgical’ response—for the powerful to sacrificially relate to another. The West, with 
its military strength and more robust economy, is not accustomed to vulnerability. What 
the 9/11, Madrid, and 7/7 attacks demonstrated was that these strengths did not preclude 
attacks. Protecting citizens is of primary importance yet virulent responses may be 
pointless exercises by simply feeding into the tit-for-tat game. The anxiety wrought by 
terrorism must be conscientiously dealt with—not reacted to. Levinas’ liturgy ends (the 
useless) retaliation and revenge by asking for a different conceptualization of a powerful 
self and a rehumanizing of the scapegoated Muslim other. 
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